Abstract
dc:description.abstractChristine Korsgaard has attempted to defend a distinct approach to metaethics – Neo-Kantian Constructivism. Not only does she present a positive case for her own view, she also attacks existing metaethical positions and even the disctinctions that metaethics has traditionally relied on. This thesis is a sustained examination of this position. I consider whether Korsgaard can legitimately claim to be offering a metaethical position at all, providing her with some defence against the scepticism of some metaethicists. I also examine her attacks on traditional metaethical positions (in particular moral realism and expressivism). I argue that her attack on moral realism can be avoided if the realism on offer takes a particular form. In the case of expressivism I claim that Korsgaard’s attack, though not fully developed in her work, motivates an examination of contemporary hybrid-expressivist theories. I argue that these are, as of yet, no advance over their non-hybrid cousins. Finally I examine Korsgaard’s own position, attempting to make it clearer by combining her claims with a framework developed by Crispin Wright for judgement-dependent qualities. This gives Korsgaard her best chance of a distinctive metaethical position. Ultimately, though, the Neo-Kantian approach to morality fails.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- d_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- d_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2012
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Surgener, Kirk
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng