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University of Birmingham

Should an understanding of the theory of evolution have any effect on meta-ethics and if so is Michael Ruse inconsistent in rejecting meta-ethical realism whilst still defending a form of practical moral realism?

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation examines the implications of seeing moral beliefs and moral behaviour as evolutionary adaptations. In particular, it discusses whether or not an evolutionary explanation of human moral behaviour should lead us to reject the idea of objective moral facts. I agree with Michael Ruse that moral behaviour can be explained in naturalistic terms. However Ruse believes that this should not lead us to reject some forms of moral realism, as morality is a shared adaptation. My arguments against this are twofold. Firstly I believe that if morality is a product of natural forces then there will be variation between individuals’ moral sense; which should give us cause to reject all forms of moral realism. My second argument is that Ruse is internally inconsistent, and he is trying to ‘sneak’ moral facts back into the picture, having previously rejected them.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
m_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
m_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Glover, Nathan Harold Stephen

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Glover, Nathan Harold Stephen. Should an understanding of the theory of evolution have any effect on meta-ethics and if so is Michael Ruse inconsistent in rejecting meta-ethical realism whilst still defending a form of practical moral realism?. m_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013.