Abstract
dc:description.abstractPervasive systems enhance a user's everyday experience. However, the use of pervasive sensing and context aware devices can result very intrusive from a privacy perspective. A familiar pervasive device is a mobile phone. Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried everywhere. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting their privacy is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use experimental and formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of mobile telephony protocols. We expose novel threats to the user privacy, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and for some of the attacks we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation. We propose fixes to these privacy issues. We prove that our privacy friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties. Finally, we develop the first extension of the Pro Verif tool for the automatic verification of equivalence based properties of stateful protocols. This work shows how to formally verity privacy properties of pervasive systems. Moreover, we develop an automatic verification tool for the verification of equivalence based properties of stateful protocols. Further work in this direction will eventually widen the class of security protocols and security properties verifiable using automatic verification tools.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- d_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- d_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Mancini, Loretta Ilaria
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Grantnumber
- EP/F033206/1 Verifying Interoperability Requirments in Pervasive Systems