Back to search

University of Birmingham

Formal Verification of Privacy in Pervasive Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Pervasive systems enhance a user's everyday experience. However, the use of pervasive sensing and context aware devices can result very intrusive from a privacy perspective. A familiar pervasive device is a mobile phone. Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried everywhere. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting their privacy is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use experimental and formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of mobile telephony protocols. We expose novel threats to the user privacy, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and for some of the attacks we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation. We propose fixes to these privacy issues. We prove that our privacy friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties. Finally, we develop the first extension of the Pro Verif tool for the automatic verification of equivalence based properties of stateful protocols. This work shows how to formally verity privacy properties of pervasive systems. Moreover, we develop an automatic verification tool for the verification of equivalence based properties of stateful protocols. Further work in this direction will eventually widen the class of security protocols and security properties verifiable using automatic verification tools.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
d_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
d_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Mancini, Loretta Ilaria

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
EP/F033206/1 Verifying Interoperability Requirments in Pervasive Systems

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Mancini, Loretta Ilaria. Formal Verification of Privacy in Pervasive Systems. d_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2015.