Back to search

University of Birmingham

The epistemic rationality of emotions: a new defence

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Emotions and epistemic rationality have been traditionally considered to be in opposition. In the last twenty years, the role of emotions in epistemology has been increasingly acknowledged, but there is no systematic argument for the rational assessability of emotions that is compatible with both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of emotions and fits with the epistemic rational assessability of mental states in general. This thesis aims to fill this gap. Using empirically informed philosophical methodology, I offer a novel account of the rational assessability of emotions that fits with the rational assessability of other mental states and that could in principle be accepted by cognitivist and some prominent non-cognitivist theories of emotions. The possibility to epistemically rationally assess emotions opens up a fresh set of questions that regards the nature of the evaluations involved in the emotions, the epistemic norms that apply to them and the extent to which we are epistemically responsible for our emotions. This thesis aims to address these questions, ultimately showing that emotions and epistemic rationality are more intertwined than we previously thought.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
d_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
d_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Aliffi, Matilde

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
Midlands4Cities

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Aliffi, Matilde. The epistemic rationality of emotions: a new defence. d_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2019.