Back to search

Boston University

The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings management

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This paper examines whether the adoption of clawback provisions decreases earnings management. Clawback provisions are intended to discourage managers' opportunistic behavior by enabling companies to recoup erroneously awarded compensation in the event of an accounting restatement. Using firms that voluntarily implement clawback provisions, I find that clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual-based and real earnings management in the post-adoption period, relative to non-adopters. These results are robust to multiple approaches controlling for endogeneity of the clawback decision. In addition, these results are also consistent within subsamples of firms facing high level of incentives to manage earnings, suggesting that clawback provisions remain effective in curbing accrual-based earnings management even when managers are under more pressure to manipulate earnings. Overall, the findings are consistent with clawback adoption signaling a move towards overall higher reporting quality.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor dc:publisher
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Yu, Lin-Hui

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11091

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Yu, Lin-Hui. The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings management. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2013. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11091