Boston University
The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings management
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis paper examines whether the adoption of clawback provisions decreases earnings management. Clawback provisions are intended to discourage managers' opportunistic behavior by enabling companies to recoup erroneously awarded compensation in the event of an accounting restatement. Using firms that voluntarily implement clawback provisions, I find that clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual-based and real earnings management in the post-adoption period, relative to non-adopters. These results are robust to multiple approaches controlling for endogeneity of the clawback decision. In addition, these results are also consistent within subsamples of firms facing high level of incentives to manage earnings, suggesting that clawback provisions remain effective in curbing accrual-based earnings management even when managers are under more pressure to manipulate earnings. Overall, the findings are consistent with clawback adoption signaling a move towards overall higher reporting quality.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Management
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2013
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Yu, Lin-Hui
Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11091