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Boston University

The doctrine of essence in the philosophy of George Santayana

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to present and evaluate George Santayana's doctrine of essence from two perspectives, one epistemological and the other ontological. The interrelation of these two areas of thought renders isolated treatment possible. For this reason essence is demonstrated to be at once (1) a primordial form of being, (2) a necessary condition for thought to occur, and (3) the content of thought. Stayana's theory of knowledge rests on a distinction between transitive knowledge and intransitive intuition, the latter not being knowledge at all. His position is that when judgement and belief are suspended in intuition, so also is knowledge, Santayana demonstrates this by exercising a radical skepticism which he does no rest until an indubitable is reached. For the skeptic the experience of this indubitable is the intuition of a datum or essence. This intuition of a datum is not knowledge because it is immediate, direct and intransitive whereas knowledge is mediate transitive and referential. [TRUNCATED]

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
1959

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hockenos, Warren J.

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
b14702381

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Hockenos, Warren J.. The doctrine of essence in the philosophy of George Santayana. masters thesis, Boston University, 1959. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17799