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Boston University

Design of reliable and secure devices by algebraic manipulation codes

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, we firstly present the secure multipliers protected by the AMD codes, and demonstrate that the fault masking probabilities are not worse than the results based on the theoretical analysis of error masking probabilities, if the attacker injects faults at outputs of the inside logic gates of the protected devices. Single-errorcorrecting, double-error-detecting (SEC-DED) codes are widely used for the design of errors, thus they are not suitable for memories used in cryptographic devices. Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes provide strong protection against fault injection attacks. But traditional AMD codes can not be used for correcting errors. In this thesis, we also present the constructions of the strongly secure algebraic manipulation correction (AMC) codes. The estimation for a probability for miscorrection of multiple errors is given. Hardware implementations of strongly secure SEC-DED memories based on the proposed codes are presented. Comparison with other codes which have been used for SEC-DED memories with security or weak security are given in terms of numbers of undetected errors, sizes of security kernels and miscorrection probabilities as well as latency, area and power consumption for encoders and decoders. An error handling method to distinguish between random errors and fault injection attacks is presented as well. The proposed code can be applied to most secure-critical memories in cryptographic devices. As far as we know, this is the only efficient approach to provide both high reliability for single and double random errors, and high security for strong fault attack when an attacker has a control of both on the messages (outputs of the memories) and the errors.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science in Engineering
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ge, Shizun

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/21153

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ge, Shizun. Design of reliable and secure devices by algebraic manipulation codes. masters thesis, Boston University, 2012. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/21153