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Boston University

Security analysis of bytecode interpreters using Alloy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Security of programming languages, particularly programming languages used for network applications, is a major issue at this time. Despite the best efforts of language designers and implementers, serious security vulnerabilities continue to be discovered at an alarming rate. Thus, development of analysis tools that can be used to uncover insecure or malicious code is an important area of research. This thesis focuses on the use of the lightweight formal method tool Alloy to perform static analysis on binary code, Byte-compiled languages that run on virtual machines are of particular interest because of their relatively small instruction sets, and also because they are well represented on the Internet. This thesis describes a static analysis methodology in which desired security properties of a language are expressed as constraints in Alloy, while the actual bytes being analyzed are expressed as Alloy model initializers. The combination of these two components yields a complete Alloy model in which any model counterexample represents a constraint violation, and hence a security vulnerability. The general method of expressing security requirements as constraints is studied, and results are presented for Java bytecodes running on the Java Virtual Machine, as well as for Adobe Flash SWF files containing ActionScript bytecodes running on the Action Script Virtual Machine. It is demonstrated that many examples of malware are detected by this technique. In addition, analysis of benign software is shown to not produce any counterexamples. This represents a significant departure from standard methods based on signatures or anomaly detection.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Reynolds, Mark Clifford

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • This work is being made available in OpenBU by permission of its author, and is available for research purposes only. All rights are reserved to the author.
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Barcode
11719032088934
Dc Identifier Bibid
99199899690001161

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Reynolds, Mark Clifford. Security analysis of bytecode interpreters using Alloy. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2012. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/32048