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Boston University

Essays on behavioral and dynamic contract

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation studies the design of prices or incentives in dynamic settings where customers are privately informed about their psychological biases, or agents are privately informed about the technology. Chapter 1 studies how firms set prices when their consumers have time-inconsistent preferences and naive beliefs. Temptation goods, such as credit card-financed con- sumption, are overvalued by consumers in the short run. It is typically assumed that a monopolistic firm maximizes profit by pricing temptation goods above marginal cost when consumer naivete is observable. However, market evidence contradicts this result. This chapter explains the puzzle by the assumption that consumer naivete is unobservable. Then it is optimal for a monopoly seller to offer a menu of options that have prices both above and below marginal cost. Chapter 2 studies a project manager deciding on workers’ workload assignments. Workers face productivity shocks over time. Workers also tend to procrastinate, although they prefer flexibility in production. Commitment of early production can overcome procrastination. The optimal compensation scheme depends on whether the manager’s objective is to maximize profit or welfare. It also depends on the degree of workers’ procrastination. When the worker is a serious procrastinator, it is optimal for a profit-maximizing manager to monitor midterm output according to a pass-fail criterion. The final chapter studies an investor deciding on resource allocation and manage- rial compensation. The manager privately observes time-varying project quality. A signal that contains information about the evolution of future quality is also privately available to the manager initially. When the manager reports a better initial signal, the investor allocates more resources to the project in every period. Growth of the project scale depends on how strongly the initial signal predicts future quality. How- ever, the project with a better initial signal may grow more slowly and distortions may persist indefinitely.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gao, Buqu
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ma, Ching-To Albert

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/33237

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Gao, Buqu. Essays on behavioral and dynamic contract. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/33237