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Boston University

Bargaining and informed agent's advice: theory and evidence

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation investigates the market effect of informed agents' advice to buyers and sellers. I compare two kinds of informed agents: one who maximizes an expected sales price, the price-maximizing agent, and one who maximizes the probability of trade, the trade-maximizing agent. The first chapter presents a theoretical model and results. The model is based on a bilateral bargaining game with an informed agent, where the agent has more information than either the buyer or the seller. I show that if there exists a bargaining equilibrium in which a price-maximizing agent disseminates information truthfully, then there also exists a bargaining equilibrium in which a trade-maximizing agent disseminates information truthfully. However, the converse is not true. Thus, for some cases, a trade-maximizing agent is truthful, but a price-maximizing agent is not. In such cases, a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher trade probability and a higher expected sales price than a price-maximizing agent. The second chapter studies the model under specific assumptions. Here, both the buyer's and seller's good valuations are uniformly distributed, and the agent knows whether each of the buyer and seller has a high or low valuation. I analyze three cases: an informed agent advises (1) a buyer only, (2) a seller only, and (3) both. Whereas a trade-maximizing agent is always truthful, a price-maximizing agent over-reports a seller's valuation to increase the sales price. The third chapter empirically tests the model prediction: a trade-maximizing agent leads to a higher trade probability than a price-maximizing agent. I do so using South Korean housing transaction data. I exploit the unique Korean real estate agents' commission scheme to identify the two kinds of agents. I solve the missing listing data problem by applying cluster analysis, which is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. I show the conditions under which the number of sales is the appropriate proxy for the trade probability even when listing data are missing. The results show that a trade-maximizing agent brings an approximately 0.2% greater number of sales in each ten-day period relative to a price-maximizing agent.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Kim, Sanghoon
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ma, Ching-to Albert
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/38998

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Kim, Sanghoon. Bargaining and informed agent's advice: theory and evidence. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/38998