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Boston University

Essays on the econometric analysis of treatment assignment rules and altruistic preferences

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation has two main themes: treatment assignment rules and altruistic preferences. The first two chapters are about comparing different treatment assignment rules using observational data. The third chapter studies how altruistic preferences are affected by markets and incentives. In Chapter 1, I develop a theoretical framework to compare different treatment assignment rules. A treatment assignment rule is a mapping from observed characteristics to binary treatment status. The welfare difference between two given treatment assignment rules is not point identified in general when data are obtained from an observational study or a randomized experiment with imperfect compliance. I characterize the sharp identified region of the welfare difference and obtain bounds under various assumptions on the unobservables with and without instrumental variables. I conduct estimation and inference of the bounds using orthogonalized moment conditions to deal with the presence of infinite-dimensional nuisance parameters. In Chapter 2, I apply the method I proposed in Chapter 1 to examine two applications in economics. First, I study the problem of assigning individuals to job training programs. I calculate the welfare differences between different hypothetical policies using experimental data from the National Job Training Partnership Act Study. Second, I apply the method to study public health insurance policies. Specifically, I calculate the welfare impact of Medicaid expansion using data from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. Chapter 3 (joint with Ching-to Albert Ma and Daniel Wiesen) studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives using a laboratory experiment. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. We combine a theoretical model of strategic interaction with a nonparametric estimation method and find that markets tend to reduce altruism.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Byambadalai, Undral
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Kaido, Hiroaki
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43920

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Byambadalai, Undral. Essays on the econometric analysis of treatment assignment rules and altruistic preferences. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43920