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Boston University

Mirror worlds, eclipse attacks and the security of Bitcoin and the RPKI

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

While distributed databases offer great promise their decentralized nature poses a number of security and privacy issues. In what ways can parties misbehave? If a database is truly distributed can a malicious actor hide their misdeeds by presenting conflicting views of the database? Can we overcome such deceit and either prevent it by eliminating trust assumptions or detect such perfidy and hold the malicious party to account? We study these questions across two distributed databases: RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure), which is used to authenticate the allocation and announcement of IP prefixes; and Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that utilizes a permissionless database called a blockchain to track the transfer and ownership of bitcoins. The first part of this dissertation focuses on RPKI and the potential of RPKI authorities to misbehave. We consider the methods, motivations, and impact of this misbehavior and how an RPKI authority can present inconsistent views to hide this misbehavior. After studying the problem we propose solutions to detect and identify such misbehavior. Now we turn our attention to Bitcoin. We look at ways an attacker can manipulate Bitcoin's Peer-to-Peer network to cause members of the network to have inconsistent views of Bitcoin's blockchain and subvert Bitcoin's core security guarantees. We then propose countermeasures to harden Bitcoin against such attacks. The final part of this dissertation discusses the problem of privacy in Bitcoin. Many of the protocols developed to address Bitcoin's privacy limitations introduce trusted parties. We instead design privacy enhancing protocols that use an untrusted intermediary to mix \aka anonymize, bitcoin transactions via blind signatures. To do this we must invent a novel blind signature fair-exchange protocol that runs on Bitcoin's blockchain. This dissertation favors a dirty slate design process. We work to layer protections on existing protocols and when we must make changes to the underlying protocol we carefully weigh compatibility and deployment considerations. This philosophy has resulted in some of the research described in this dissertation influencing the design of deployed protocols. In the case of Bitcoin our research is currently used to harden a network controlling approximately a trillion dollars.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Heilman, Ethan
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Reyzin, Leonid
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/44796

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Heilman, Ethan. Mirror worlds, eclipse attacks and the security of Bitcoin and the RPKI. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/44796