Back to search

Boston University

Vertical bargaining, merger, and information disclosure: empirics of retail groceries

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation consists of three essays in empirical industrial organization. In the first essay, I develop a method of estimating the bargaining power allocation between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers using limited data. Retailers and manufacturers engage in pairwise Nash bargaining sessions to set wholesale prices, and then retailers set retail prices to maximize their profits. By solving the model using backward induction, I compute marginal costs as functions of bargaining power parameters and choose the parameter that produces marginal costs that best fit the variation of input costs to identify the bargaining power allocation. Using retail market-level data in the yogurt industry, I find that retailers have higher bargaining power and charge higher markups than manufacturers. Additionally, higher retailer bargaining power allows them to negotiate lower wholesale prices, which leads to lower retail prices. Consumers and retailers benefit from higher retailer bargaining power, while manufacturers suffer losses. In the second essay, I simulate vertical mergers using the results in the first essay. Vertical mergers promote efficiency by eliminating double marginalization and lowering upstream rival wholesale prices, but harm welfare by increasing downstream rival costs and introducing upward pricing pressure on retail prices. To compare the relative magnitude of various effects and evaluate their overall impact on the market equilibrium profit and welfare, I simulate vertical mergers between firms of various sizes and compute the change in prices, markups, firm profits, and consumer welfare. The overall consumer welfare increases after a merger, but consumers purchasing nonvertically integrated brands are worse off. In the third essay, I study how consumers learn the healthfulness of ready-to-eat cereals from the introduction of front-of-package nutrition labels and how they make purchase decisions accordingly. I first examine consumers’ purchasing decisions in a static setting and then allow consumers to gradually learn from the FOP labels. In each shopping trip, consumers update their information on the healthfulness of cereals based on FOP labels, and they consider the perceived information when they make purchasing decisions. I find that consumers learn slowly after the introduction of FOP labels, and they prefer cereals with high healthfulness.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gao, Chen
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Rysman, Marc S.

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/45276

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Gao, Chen. Vertical bargaining, merger, and information disclosure: empirics of retail groceries. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/45276