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Boston University

Creator platform design

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

A creator platform utilizes marketing tools and pricing policies to maximize customer acquisition and revenue, with trade-offs among the creators, their audience, and the platform itself. In chapter “Referral Program Design”, we focus on how a platform can leverage a referral program to acquire new subscribers and maximize profit, and quantify the financial consequences of referral marketing with a structural model. The return from implementing a referral program for the creator is a function of the size of the monetary reward for successful referrals, and the price charged for new subscriptions. We find a substantial contribution of applying referral marketing to creators’ revenue, but this varies for specific types of content with different referral effectiveness and operation costs. Further, we document inverted-U shaped relationships for profit and demand as the size of referral rewards increase. Using counterfactual analysis, we highlight the disparity of profit-optimizing referral marketing design between creators and the platform since creators focus on short term profit while the platform focuses on long run user base growth. In chapter “Platform Commission Design”, we study the impact of platform commission changes on creators’ pricing decisions and quality. The same creator platform underwent significant adjustments to its commission policy. In August 2019, the platform increased its commission from 5% to 20% for all creators, and later allowed eligible creators to revert to the original 5% commission. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the consequences of subsidizing eligible creators with a lower commission, and find a significant price increase induced by the commission cut, which contrasts sharply with classic prediction from third-degree price discrimination. If the initial commission increase altered market concentration, the subsequent reduction in commission could incentivize some creators to raise prices in order to reveal their status as high-quality content providers. This study suggests that changes in commission should be approached with caution due to their irreversible effects. Increasing commission while discriminating against a segment of creators shifts content and price distribution, potentially disadvantaging subscribers and reducing their welfare.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zhao, Pu
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Zervas, Georgios
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/48834

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Zhao, Pu. Creator platform design. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/48834