Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe paper examines a continuous-time principal-agent model in which agent’s preference exhibits habit formation over consumption. As agent’s concern over the standard of living strengthens, his continuation utility is less sensitive to current wealth but more sensitive to the standard of living, leading to lower demand for risk-sharing compensation. The optimal contract has lower pay-for-performance but incentivizes agent’s higher effort. In the Leland (1994) capital structure model, agent’s habit formation preference combined with the optimal contract lowers firm’s leverage and mitigates the debt-overhang problem.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Mathematical Finance
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wang, Jingyan
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Xing, Hao
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/48891