Back to search

Boston University

Optimal contract with habit formation

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The paper examines a continuous-time principal-agent model in which agent’s preference exhibits habit formation over consumption. As agent’s concern over the standard of living strengthens, his continuation utility is less sensitive to current wealth but more sensitive to the standard of living, leading to lower demand for risk-sharing compensation. The optimal contract has lower pay-for-performance but incentivizes agent’s higher effort. In the Leland (1994) capital structure model, agent’s habit formation preference combined with the optimal contract lowers firm’s leverage and mitigates the debt-overhang problem.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Mathematical Finance
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wang, Jingyan
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Xing, Hao
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/48891

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Wang, Jingyan. Optimal contract with habit formation. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/48891