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Boston University

Essays on incentive design and healthcare delivery reform in health economics

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation considers mechanisms to improve healthcare delivery andreduce healthcare costs, both through the incentives created by risk adjustment methodology and the study of an intervention to improve care for children with medical complexity. The first chapter, joint with Randall Ellis, Jeffrey Siracuse, Allan Walkey, Karen Lasser, Brian Jacobson, Alex Hoagland, Ying Liu, Chenlu Song, Tzu-Chun Kuo, and Arlene Ash, characterizes a novel diagnosis classification system, the Diagnostic Items Classification (DXI) System. The system leverages the detail embedded in the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification. The system performs better than benchmark risk adjustment models across a range of measures of model fit, especially for individuals with rare diseases. Addressing systemic underpayment for individuals with rare diseases has potential implications for the quality of care they receive. The second chapter, joint with Randall Ellis, Jeffrey Siracuse, Alexander Hoagland, Heather Hsu, Allan Walkey, Karen Lasser, Tzu-Chun Kuo, and Arlene Ash proposes a regression algorithm for variable selection in risk adjustment models. Risk adjustment systems are vulnerable to gameability, particularly in the form of upv coding. This work develops a computationally feasible, transparent, and clinically informed approach to undermine gaming incentives while maintaining predictive power. The third chapter evaluates a project to improve care for children with medical complexity (CMC): The Collaborative Improvement and Innovation Network to Advance Care for Children with Medical Complexity (CoIIN). While CMC represent a small share of the population of children, they are associated with a disproportionately large share of healthcare spending, and their families face significant burdens. I conduct a claims-based evaluation of the effect of the programs at two sites on a range of utilization outcomes, including inpatient (IP) admissions and length of stay (LOS), emergency department (ED) visits, outpatient (OP) provider encounters, and days with OP provider encounters. I do not find robust statistically significant changes in utilization from the interventions. This study lays the foundation for future work, and provides informative descriptive statistics to inform future study design.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Andriola, Corinne
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ellis, Randall P.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49357

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Andriola, Corinne. Essays on incentive design and healthcare delivery reform in health economics. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49357