Abstract
dc:description.abstractCertain uses of genetic engineering may present problems for, or threats to "humanity." Specific problems treated are ones for "humanity" as a form of moral status. These involve the moral significance of the distinction between humans and nonhumans, and the justifications for moral equality among human beings. To the extent that these depend upon the genetic endowment of humans (or of the entities humans interact with), genetic changes can change moral status relationships. They can change what counts as a human being, as well as change what treatment human beings are entitled to from other human beings. These problems are treated in the context of a discussion of the general function of moral status assignment. A framework for the discussion of moral status is introduced, based on the notion of moral subservience, and in which different levels of subservience form the boundaries of relationships between entities, whether of different or the same moral status. Problems raised by genetic engineering for the human / nonhuman distinction are found to be morally significant given a "pro-human speciesist" presupposition. Given certain views of the ontological level at which moral status is manifested, pro-human speciesism cannot be maintained in the face of genetic engineering possibilities. A strengthened basis for pro-human speciesism that grounds moral status in lineages is presented which solves some of these problems. Problems raised by genetic engineering for intrahuman moral equality will depend on certain justifications for making some humans subservient to others. In considering the possibility of the "genetic stratification" of human society and the "appropriation of purposes" of genetically-specialized individuals, I attempt to identify social and normative presuppositions that would make such justifications sound. The prospects of genetic engineering threaten the equation, at the genetic level, of the "natural" with the "essential," and the relevance of the two for the justification of moral status. The intrusion of human choice into these areas requires greater responsibility for such choices and less reliance upon what is "given. "
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 1989
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Rosenfeld, Robert P
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Barcode
- 11719013313277
- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 99195572650001161
- Dc Identifier Other
- b17713572