Boston University
Veteran enrollment in Medicare Advantage: analyses of favorable selection, plan marketing, and utilization
Abstract
dc:description.abstractDual enrollment between the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and Medicare Advantage (MA), the private alternative to Traditional Medicare (TM), poses a unique budgetary issue for the federal government. While the VHA operates under a global budgeting system, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prospectively pays MA plans a risk adjusted capitation rate that does not account for enrollees' VHA utilization. Consequently, MA plans are still paid for enrollees who use VHA care, even if they use no MA services. This effectively creates a duplicate spending problem for the federal government and a financial incentive for plans to enroll VHA-reliant Veterans. Over the last decade, the VHA has spent over $78 billion for dual MA-VHA enrollees. With 1.3 million dual MA-VHA enrollees, there are concerns that duplicate federal spending has increased alongside the growth of MA and with the emergence of novel Veteran Medicare Advantage Affinity Plans (VMAPs) marketing to the Veteran population. However, this topic has been underexplored in recent years. In this dissertation, I use CMS MA plan directory files, VHA administrative claims and encounters, and MA encounter data to examine dual MA-VHA enrollment, plans' benefit design, and enrollees' VHA utilization between 2016 and 2022. Aim 1 examines who MA enrolls from VHA population compared to TM, identifying potential factors for favorable selection that are unobservable in the CMS risk adjustment model from 2016-2019. Aim 2 examines what benefits MA plans offer to Veteran enrollees, focusing on the novel VMAPs marketing to Veterans in 2022. Finally, Aim 3 leverages changes in MA plans' marketing and benefit design to analyze the effect of VMAP rebranding on VHA reliance (use of VHA care), compared to other MA plans, using a difference-in-difference design between 2019-2022. Collectively, this dissertation highlights the mechanisms for selection of VHA-reliant enrollees into MA. These results can provide CMS and VHA leadership with a deeper understanding of MA-VHA enrollment and can be used to help support legislative changes and payment reform options that address this duplicate spending problem.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Health Services Research
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Dorneo, Allison
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Garrido, Melissa M.
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/52038