Back to search

Boston University

Essays on operational decisions for platforms

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation examines how platform design choices --- contracts, disclosure rules, and fee structures --- shape the behavior of heterogeneous agents and the resulting market outcomes. Across three chapters, I study operational decisions in distinct platform settings: a food markdown platform that redistributes surplus inventory, a game distribution platform where developers disclose their use of AI, and a virtual marketplace where players trade digital items. Each essay combines analytical or empirical methods with managerial relevance, contributing to the operations management literature on platform economics, sustainability, and technology adoption. Chapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of the strategic interactions between a food markdown platform, a restaurant, and consumers. We analyze how revenue-sharing contracts, pricing mechanisms, and consumer behavior determine whether platforms reduce or exacerbate food waste. Under myopic consumers, markdown platforms always improve restaurant profitability, but their impact on food waste depends on the revenue-sharing contract: we derive closed-form thresholds that delineate a "win-win-win'' region where the platform is profitable, the restaurant benefits, and food waste decreases. Under a mixed population of myopic and strategic consumers, strategic waiting suppresses the waste paradox at the cost of a tighter participation constraint: the same cannibalization force that mitigates overstocking also erodes the restaurant's regular-period revenue, so the restaurant joins the platform only above a participation threshold that we characterize. We further show that dynamic pricing achieves the deepest waste reduction across behavioral regimes but misaligns restaurant and platform incentives under strategic waiting, while the wholesale price contract eliminates the waste paradox by construction but is commercially viable on a narrow set of parameters when consumers are forward-looking. Chapter 3 provides large-scale empirical evidence on AI integration and its market reception in creative product development, using data on over 56,000 video games released on the Steam platform. We examine how organizational characteristics --- publishing mode, developer experience, and indie status --- shape AI disclosure decisions, application patterns, and market consequences. The central finding is that market responses to AI use depend on developer identity: the same AI application that is associated with lower outcomes for established developers is associated with neutral or favorable outcomes for resource-constrained indie studios. Chapter 4 develops a game-theoretic framework for spatially differentiated commission fees in virtual player-to-player marketplaces. We model a platform that sets fees to balance revenue and player welfare, while heterogeneous players choose between a congested hub and a peripheral marketplace. We find that a hub-only floating fee improves allocative efficiency when congestion effects dominate network effects, but the distributional consequences depend on the constraint regime. When the platform can extract full surplus, efficiency gains accrue to the platform rather than to players; when fee caps bind, spatial pricing can serve as an efficiency tool that may also benefit players under certain conditions.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Feng, Linghui
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Bellamy, Marcus A.
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/52967

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Feng, Linghui. Essays on operational decisions for platforms. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/52967