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Boston University

Competition in the United States retail investing and banking markets

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The first chapter examines the empirical implications of payment for order flow (PFOF). The recent surge of retail investing activities in the United States (US) has intensified scrutiny of PFOF, a compensation practice through which brokers receive rebates from market makers for directing customer orders. Policymakers have raised concerns that the practice incentivizes brokers to prioritize maximizing their PFOF revenues over securing optimal execution outcomes for their clients. In response, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed various policies, including a ban on PFOF, but these proposals have encountered opposition from industry participants. To evaluate the welfare implications of PFOF, I develop and estimate a structural model that characterizes the execution of retail orders. Market makers strategically contract with brokers and compete for retail orders by improving execution prices. Brokers subsequently send client orders to market makers for execution and receive PFOF in compensation. The empirical findings suggest that market makers incur significant fixed costs for contracting with brokers and earn varying revenues from providing execution. Despite significant heterogeneity across individual orders, brokers generally prioritize execution quality in their routing decisions. The counterfactual simulations demonstrate that a ban on PFOF increases the number of contracts between market makers and brokers, raising the average price improvement and enhancing the overall welfare through increased competition. Conversely, a consolidation between two large brokers may negatively impact investor surplus contingent on the strategic adjustments made by the integrated entity. In the second chapter, I conduct a retrospective analysis of US bank mergers between 1994 and 2023 in a joint work with Hannah Zhang. Policymakers have recently expressed concerns about growing concentration in the US banking industry with nearly 6,000 merger approvals over the past three decades. We employ a difference-in-differences framework to analyze the impact of bank mergers on local banking competition. Our findings suggest that mergers generally result in fewer bank branches and a decrease in total market deposits. The interest rates of various depository products also tend to decline following a merger. These effects are more pronounced among the merging parties compared to their competitors. We further categorize mergers as pro- and anti-competitive based on the regulatory thresholds and investigate whether their effects on various banking outcomes differ. The results show that anti-competitive mergers lead to sharper declines in the number of branches and total deposits in the market than pro-competitive mergers, although there is no significant difference in their effects on interest rates. The third chapter studies the competition among market makers for retail order execution in the US financial market. Policymakers have voiced concerns about the high level of concentration within this segment and its potential impact on retail trading outcomes. Using the security-level Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, I find that the retail segment is indeed highly concentrated with significant variation across securities. Contrary to the concerns, concentration levels have generally declined over the last few years. The regression results further suggest a negative correlation between execution quality measures and concentration levels, despite some indications of efficiency gains in the likelihood and speed of execution for market makers.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lee, Kanghun
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Rysman, Marc S.

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53100

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lee, Kanghun. Competition in the United States retail investing and banking markets. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53100