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Boston University

Essays in industrial organization and finance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My dissertation makes use of micro-data and employs structural techniques to quantitatively study the welfare implications of policies in the financial markets. In the first chapter, I study the source of price dispersion in the U.S. mortgage market and how lenders' pricing strategies affect adverse selection. In the U.S. mortgage market, each given lender charges observably similar borrowers different interest rates for similar loans. To explain the conditional price dispersion, I estimate a structural model that features borrowers' demand for mortgages and lenders' individualized optimal pricing decisions. The evidence is consistent with adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of borrowers' demand and lenders' costs. Moreover, lenders' ability to learn borrowers' private information from signals and tailor interest rates alleviates the severity of adverse selection. Signals convey more information about lenders' costs rather than borrowers' demand, implying that the conditional price dispersion is explained more by lenders' optimal risk adjustments rather than demand-based price discrimination. In a counterfactual scenario where lenders must set the same interest rates for the observably same borrowers, interest rates increase and consumer surplus decreases. The effect is heterogeneous across income groups with higher-income borrowers’ interest rates increasing more. In the second chapter, I study the competitive and distributional impacts of shadow banks in the mortgage markets. In recent decades, there has been a shift from traditional banks' balance sheet lending to shadow banks' originate-to-distribute lending in the US mortgage market. This paper documents that shadow banks lend more to lower-income borrowers and charge lower interest rates than banks on average. Moreover, I study the impact of government loan guarantee schemes on shadow banks' growing dominance in the market by exploiting a regression discontinuity at the eligibility cutoff of the guarantee. I find that shadow banks' interest rates increase discontinuously and to a greater extent than banks at the eligibility cutoff. To explain why non-banks can offer lower interest rates, I estimate a structural model of the mortgage market featuring borrowers' heterogeneous preferences for mortgages and lenders' competition. The results suggest that shadow banks charge similar mark-ups to banks, have lower marginal costs, and hence offer lower prices than banks. I conclude that nonbanks' lower rates are mostly driven by their cost savings, with a possible channel being their light regulatory burden. I simulate a counterfactual scenario where shadow banks incur tighter regulation by increasing their marginal costs. The results suggest that moderate-to-low-income borrowers suffer a larger increase in interest rates and the top income loses the most in the total cost of loans as they borrow larger loans. In a joint project with Tim Lee, the third chapter conducts a retrospective analysis of bank mergers in the United States from 1994 to 2023 and examines the current bank merger review process. Policymakers have raised concerns about the growing concentration in the banking industry, particularly regarding the reliance on the HHI cutoff rule for assessing the competitiveness of a merger. We use a differences-in-differences approach to document that bank mergers generally reduce the number of local branches and decrease total deposits within the market. We also find that interest rates for various depository products, such as certificates of deposit, money market accounts, and savings accounts, decrease significantly after a merger. Moreover, we exploit the quasi-exogenous variation in the HHI cutoff rule to classify mergers as pro- and anti-competitive and explore their implications for banking competition. The results suggest that the HHI cutoff rule adequately screens anti-competitive mergers, as they lead to sharper declines in the number of branches, deposit amounts, and various depository rates than pro-competitive mergers.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zhang, Huihan
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Rysman, Marc

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53132

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Zhang, Huihan. Essays in industrial organization and finance. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53132