Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation studies equilibrium outcomes in dynamic settings, when the agents face uncertainty. The first chapter studies a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. In this setting, the stochastic nature of the monitoring technology causes future payoffs to be uncertain. The second chapter studies the decision to donate a deceased family member's organs. We assume that people are uncertain about their relatives' donation preferences and, as a result, the default registration rules induce a signaling game between the deceased person and their decision proxy. The third chapter studies a hierarchical contractual arrangement with many agents and one principal. Profit maximization by the principal can then be modelled as a dynamic optimization problem with the supervision technology introducing uncertainty.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Gupta, Ayush
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Ortner, Juan
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53246