Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three chapters related to endogenous market structure and development. The first chapter examines the role of protective tariffs in inducing industrial consolidations during the Great Merger Movement of the late 19th century United States and rationalizes the main findings within an incentive-constrained coalitional model of endogenous market structure. The second chapter, joint work with Andrew Newman and Patrick Legros, introduces a labor market into the endogenous market structure model of Legros, Newman and Udvari (2024), and shows that increases in market size can drive not only rising concentration and markups, but also a falling labor share. The third chapter, joint work with Martin Fiszbein, Nicolas Guida-Johnson, and Mahesh Karra, studies the implications of occupational structure on the long-run evolution of human capital formation and wealth within an overlapping generations model with credit market imperfections. In the first chapter, I examine the relationship between protective tariffs and industrial consolidations in the context of the Great Merger Movement of the late 19th and early 20th century. I construct a new dataset of consolidations in manufacturing industries, drawing on historical sources to classify them at a detailed product level. My empirical strategy exploits two sources of variation. First, I leverage changes in tariff policy driven by party turnover as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in tariff levels. Second, I measure industry exposure to tariff changes using industries’ dutiable status and import intensity. I find that industries more strongly affected by tariff changes experienced greater surges in consolidations following tariff increases. To make sense of these findings, I build an incentive-constrained coalitional model of endogenous market structure that allows for the presence of import competition. I show that, in industries where the price of imports acts as an effective ceiling for domestic producers, higher tariffs can indeed strengthen incentives to merge and induce consolidation. The second chapter (with Andrew Newman and Patrick Legros) addresses recently documented trends of rising industry concentration and markups, and declining labor share, within an organizational model of endogenous market structure. Legros, Newman, and Udvari (2024) show that, in a homogeneous-good industry where production teams are subject to internal contracting imperfections and can join together to form oligopoly-competing firms, concentration and markups may increase with the size of the product market. We extend their model to incorporate a labor market and show that market size can drive not only rising concentration and markups, but also a falling labor share. This latter prediction results from the general equilibrium link between product and labor markets. Notably, the results hold regardless of whether oligopoly firms take advantage of labor market power. It follows naturally from our framework that demographic trends can drive changes in industry concentration, markups, and labor share, potentially providing a parsimonious and unified explanation for recent trends documented in the literature. We outline an empirical framework for testing the model's predictions and consider several extensions of the model. In the third chapter (with Martin Fiszbein, Nicolas Guida-Johnson, and Mahesh Karra), we study the long-run evolution of human capital formation and wealth within an overlapping generations model with credit market imperfections. Building on the classic framework of Galor and Zeira (1993), our model introduces two key innovations. First, we allow for any finite number of sectors that differ in the productivity and human capital requirements of their production technologies. This enables us to study the implications of the richness of the occupational structure on the presence of dynastic earnings traps and path dependence. Second, we model human capital formation as depending on both investments received during childhood and later financial investments. Assuming complementarity between the two types of investment, we show that earnings traps and path dependence may arise even in the absence of credit market imperfections. However, the set of parameter values that sustain a multiplicity of steady states shrinks monotonically as the occupational structure becomes richer.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ahumada Paras, Alonso
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Newman, Andrew F.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53260