Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation studies the political economy of socioeconomic development. I focus on understanding the personnel and organizational factors that shape state performance and development outcomes. The three chapters explore how leaders' subjective beliefs shape economic development, how reward structures affect the human capacity of the state, and how favoritism threatens talent selection. In the first chapter, I provide the first systematic evidence on the macro-level impact of leaders' subjective beliefs. To overcome identification challenges, I explore strongly-held traditional beliefs about spaces among Chinese local leaders (that some individual-specific zones are unfavorable for development, due to non-factual superstitions). I find that mayors' unfavorable zones have an average 2% lower GDP relative to other areas, driven by disrupted public investment and weaker firm and household outcomes. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that such leader biases are associated with a GDP loss of more than 0.1% for the country overall. Collectively, these findings highlight subjective beliefs as an important determinant of leader performance that matters for economic development, contributing to the broader agenda of understanding why leaders matter. In the second chapter, I study the impact of corruption crackdown on human capital supply for the state, exploiting China's staggered anti-corruption inspections. Using unique applicant data from state organizations, I find that anti-corruption induces positive selection for integrity and prosociality into the state sector, without significantly affecting overall ability. These shifts in supply are associated with enhanced post-recruitment performance. Changes in occupational preferences from a representative household panel suggest talent allocation as a prominent mechanism, with treated honest types showing higher preferences for state jobs. I further document dynamic effects wherein households increase investment in human capital and the integrity of the next generation, which can reinforce the allocational effects and generate long-term implications. These findings highlight that reward structures can significantly impact the state's human capacity, thereby linking the canonical theories of talent allocation to the flourishing empirical work on bureaucrats. In the third chapter, I extend my focus beyond the state sector and study distortions in the selection of elite scientific talent. I investigate the relationship between host institution affiliation and performance in the Chinese Science Olympiad, where a gold medal guarantees a student's admission to top universities. Using hand-collected participant-level data (2003 - 2021), I find that students affiliated with the host province have a significantly higher winning probability, and the effect is more pronounced in host provinces where corruption norms are more prevalent. I further present evidence suggestive of cheating behavior using a portion of the contest vulnerable to information leakage, as well as the centralized post-Olympiad selection outside the control of host provinces. Together, these findings shed light on the crucial role of organizational structure in designing equitable talent selection systems, speaking to widespread concerns about bias and unfairness in the allocation of opportunities.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Hong, Jihao
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Fisman, Raymond
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53285