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Boston University

Essays on experimentation, dynamic advice, and shill bidding

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Chapter 1: We study a dynamic delegation problem where a long-lived principal delegates experimentation to a sequence of short-lived agents. Each agent is active for one period before being replaced. Because the principal values future outcomes more, she has stronger incentives to experiment than the agents. We model this as a contextual bandit problem, where experimentation outcomes follow a type-dependent Poisson process. Each agent’s type affects the success probability: one type has known success probability, while the other is uncertain and could be either high or low. Players gradually learn through experimentation. Focusing on stopping-time policies, we show that experimentation follows cyclical dynamics, alternating between engagement, abandonment, and revival. Misaligned incentives between the principal and agents lead to both over- and under-experimentation. Chapter 2: This paper develops a dynamic model of expert advice in markets for credence and experience goods. Each period, a seller (the expert) sets prices for two products and recommends one to a consumer. Consumers rely on expert advice because they do not know which product fits best until after purchase. However, the expert's ability -- whether skilled or mediocre -- is private information. Skilled experts receive accurate signals about product fit, while mediocre experts have no useful information. This creates a credence good problem, where consumers cannot fully verify whether the recommendation was beneficial. I characterize the equilibria of this advice game and identify conditions under which a separating equilibrium is expert-optimal. Chapter 3: This paper examines whether shill bidding can increase revenue in a common value button auction, where dropout prices and bidder identities are unobservable. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium under two cases: when the seller uses a secret reserve price, and when the seller acts as a shill bidder. Shill bidding affects revenue by altering effective participation, which distorts bidders’ expected value of the item. Whether shill bidding or a secret reserve price is more profitable depends on the number of bidders.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Liu, Zixian
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ortner, Juan
  • Ma, Albert

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53304

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Liu, Zixian. Essays on experimentation, dynamic advice, and shill bidding. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2025. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53304