Boston University
Essays on altruistic providers, base and bonus pay, and chronological extensive form
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation comprises three essays. The first explores the principal-agent problem with intrinsic motivation. The second examines optimal linear contracts and the principal's strategic engagement with agents. The final chapter identifies a limitation in standard extensive-form analysis, introduces a new modeling approach, and proposes a refinement method. The first chapter extends the principal--agent framework of Makris and Siciliani (2013), which examined altruistic providers with discrete efficiency levels, to a continuum of efficiency levels. This extension reveals critical differences between discrete and continuous models, particularly in the feasibility of first--best mechanisms. While the discrete model allows first--best implementation under moderate altruism, this feasibility diminishes in the continuous setting. The chapter explores two key cases: low and high altruism. Under low altruism, the problem converges to a standard profit--maximization framework. For high altruism, first--order conditions may result in negative profits, necessitating two adjustment mechanisms—-first-order and zero-profit adjustments. The chapter ultimately derives an optimal mechanism that integrates both approaches. The second chapter examines linear contracts in a principal--agent setting, focusing on base pay and bonus structures under adverse selection while excluding moral hazard. The analysis incorporates nonnegativity constraints on payments, enhancing realism but introducing additional complexity. The chapter characterizes conditions under which bonuses serve as participation incentives and explores strategies for principals to engage agents effectively. The findings highlight the robustness of linear contracts across different agent risk attitudes, reinforcing their practical relevance in real-world contract design. The final chapter challenges the statement that strategically equivalent games always produce equivalent equilibrium outcomes. It demonstrates that omitting chronological structure affects not only strategically equivalent games but also strategically distinct ones with identical equilibrium outcomes. The chapter formalizes how players process information and form beliefs within extensive--form settings, exposing the limitations of existing models. In response, it introduces the chronological extensive form, an alternative framework that explicitly incorporates temporal information into players’ belief formation. An equilibrium refinement is proposed to distinguish games with distinct chronological structures. The chapter concludes with applications of this framework, demonstrating its significance in differentiating both strategically equivalent and outcome-equivalent games.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wang, Zhirui
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- MA, Ching-To Albert
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53387