Boston University
Mystical experience as cognitive fulfillment: a phenomenological approach with a Buddhist case of yogic perception
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation examines the problem of mystical experience in relation to mediation, givenness, and knowledge. Modern discussions of mystical experience have often been framed by the opposition between perennialism and constructivism. Perennialist approaches tend to preserve the immediacy and cognitive force of mystical experience, but often have difficulty accounting for the diversity of mystical reports across traditions. Constructivist approaches rightly emphasize the role of language, doctrine, practice, and cultural formation, but in their stronger forms risk reducing mystical experience to the mere enactment of prior concepts. The central problem of this dissertation is therefore how mystical experience can be conceptually mediated while still involving genuine experiential givenness. To address this problem, the dissertation develops a restricted phenomenological approach, drawing especially on Dallas Willard and Walter Hopp. Rather than asking whether the objects of mystical experience exist in a metaphysical sense, it brackets such ontological questions and analyzes how mystical objects are experienced, how they are given, and whether such givenness can ground knowledge claims. The dissertation argues that a significant class of mystical experiences can be understood as episodes of cognitive fulfillment. In such experiences, prior conceptual intentions formed through doctrine, practice, and expectation are fulfilled by intuitive givenness, so that what was previously meant, believed, or sought is now experienced as directly present. This account is tested through a Buddhist case study of yogic perception in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas, read alongside Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist epistemology. Kamalaśīla’s path of hearing, reflection, and meditation shows that nonconceptual realization does not bypass conceptual preparation, but arises through it. Dharmakīrti’s account further clarifies why yogic perception can be treated as a trustworthy cognition within a Buddhist soteriological framework. The dissertation concludes that mystical experiences are neither pure, unmediated disclosures nor merely constructed projections of prior beliefs. They are complex intentional acts in which conceptual mediation and intuitive givenness belong together. As such, mystical experiences can be knowledge-bearing in a qualified sense: their justificatory force is real, but limited by what is given, by the tradition in which the experience becomes intelligible.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Religious Studies
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Zhang, Kan
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Eckel, Malcolm David
Subjects
dc:subject × 7Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53646