Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this dissertation, I propose a novel reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism that I call the hybrid reading. Roughly put, transcendental idealism is the doctrine that the objects we can experience, or appearances, are in some way mind-dependent, and that we cannot know how things are in themselves. Current interpretations of this doctrine fall into two main camps: metaphysical and epistemic readings. According to metaphysical readings, transcendental idealism amounts to the thesis that reality has a hierarchical structure: things in themselves are what are ultimately real, while appearances are less real. Epistemic readings, by contrast, read this doctrine as merely highlighting the conditions and boundary of human knowledge. My hybrid reading steers a middle course between these two camps by combining elements from both. Like metaphysical readers, I believe that Kant's idealism offers a hierarchical picture of reality. More specifically, I argue in concurrence with metaphysical readings that appearances and things in themselves should be read as two distinct sets of beings, that Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves as what materially grounds appearances, and that appearances depend on us for their existence in Kant’s view. I agree, however, with epistemic readers that, for Kant, the conditions of human cognition are central to how we describe the world. As I read him, Kant believes that any human metaphysical endeavor is subject to the limit of the conditions or forms of our cognition and cannot reach how the world really is from the “God’s Eye” point of view. This is because he holds that our notion of an object in general – that is, any object we can possibly think – is derived from our notion of a cognizable object. Therefore, on Kant’s account, we cannot think about any object independently of the constraint of our forms of cognition. In fact, as I read him, Kant thinks we can only think about uncognizable things in themselves by analogy with objects of possible experience. I further argue that while Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves, he denies that we can have knowledge of their existence. Instead, I read his commitment to things in themselves as a form of belief (Glauben), which is justified by the interests of our reason. In short, on my reading, Kant’s transcendental idealism amounts to a radically anthropocentric metaphysics: it includes both a theory of first-order metaphysics and a meta-metaphysical account of how this metaphysics is constrained by the conditions of our cognition and the interests of our reason.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wang, Kuizhi (Lewis)
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Sedgwick, Sally
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53665