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Boston University

Towards a hybrid reading of Kant's transcendental idealism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this dissertation, I propose a novel reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism that I call the hybrid reading. Roughly put, transcendental idealism is the doctrine that the objects we can experience, or appearances, are in some way mind-dependent, and that we cannot know how things are in themselves. Current interpretations of this doctrine fall into two main camps: metaphysical and epistemic readings. According to metaphysical readings, transcendental idealism amounts to the thesis that reality has a hierarchical structure: things in themselves are what are ultimately real, while appearances are less real. Epistemic readings, by contrast, read this doctrine as merely highlighting the conditions and boundary of human knowledge. My hybrid reading steers a middle course between these two camps by combining elements from both. Like metaphysical readers, I believe that Kant's idealism offers a hierarchical picture of reality. More specifically, I argue in concurrence with metaphysical readings that appearances and things in themselves should be read as two distinct sets of beings, that Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves as what materially grounds appearances, and that appearances depend on us for their existence in Kant’s view. I agree, however, with epistemic readers that, for Kant, the conditions of human cognition are central to how we describe the world. As I read him, Kant believes that any human metaphysical endeavor is subject to the limit of the conditions or forms of our cognition and cannot reach how the world really is from the “God’s Eye” point of view. This is because he holds that our notion of an object in general – that is, any object we can possibly think – is derived from our notion of a cognizable object. Therefore, on Kant’s account, we cannot think about any object independently of the constraint of our forms of cognition. In fact, as I read him, Kant thinks we can only think about uncognizable things in themselves by analogy with objects of possible experience. I further argue that while Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves, he denies that we can have knowledge of their existence. Instead, I read his commitment to things in themselves as a form of belief (Glauben), which is justified by the interests of our reason. In short, on my reading, Kant’s transcendental idealism amounts to a radically anthropocentric metaphysics: it includes both a theory of first-order metaphysics and a meta-metaphysical account of how this metaphysics is constrained by the conditions of our cognition and the interests of our reason.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wang, Kuizhi (Lewis)
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Sedgwick, Sally

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53665

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Wang, Kuizhi (Lewis). Towards a hybrid reading of Kant's transcendental idealism. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53665