Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three essays in decision theory and behavioral economics, which are related through the common theme of decision making under complexity and cognitive constraints. The first two chapters study choice overload, which refers to the psychological phenomenon that people find it harder to choose from larger choice sets. The third chapter studies failure of backward induction in a sequential information acquisition setting. Chapter 1 examines existing experimental data and uncovers novel evidence of choice stickiness that is suggestive of choice overload. Motivated by this behavioral finding, this essay proposes a new behavioral definition of choice overload using a novel primitive. I study choice path data that tracks how provisional choice evolves along a list of alternatives and draw a connection between choice overload and the primacy effect: both arise due to cognitive constraints. In my model, the decision maker encounters alternatives sequentially and decides whether to maintain her provisional choice after each alternative is encountered. She limits consideration using a set of attributes increasing in choice set size. An axiomatic characterization is provided and supporting evidence is discussed. Chapter 2 proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. The decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention. Motivated by evidence that subjects frequently fail backward induction reasoning, Chapter 3 studies the theoretical predictions of three different models: the fully rational model that requires backward induction reasoning, the fully myopic model where the decision maker chooses the piece of information to search as if it were her final opportunity to search, and a partially myopic model, in a tractable sequential information acquisition setting. I show that these three models generate different predictions, and each model's prediction changes when the assumption changes from risk neutrality to strict risk aversion. These results can be used for future experimental testing of these models.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Yang, Jiaqi
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Noor, Jawwad
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53678