Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three essays in behavioral and development economics. In Chapter 1, I study how competition affects utility derived solely from the act of competing, independent of material outcomes. I conduct a series of experiments which show that competition affects utility through two opposing channels: a belief channel, in which competition lowers expectations of success and reduces utility; and a preference channel, through which individuals derive enjoyment directly from competing. The preference channel dominates, resulting in a net positive impact on utility. I further show that these welfare effects influence future choices: competition induces attribution bias, leading individuals to misattribute the enjoyment of competition to the underlying task and increase their willingness to engage in it again, even in the absence of competition. These effects also extend to social interactions, reducing post-competition zero-sum thinking and fostering altruism. In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Yuting Chen and Liqiang Liu, we identify a novel determinant of collectivism: exposure to centralized political power. Our identification strategy exploits variation in county distances to the historical capitals of centralized Chinese dynasties, using proximity to the dynasties’ initial territorial centroids as an instrument. Drawing on data from the 2005 China census, we find that individuals residing in counties closer to historical capitals of centralized regimes exhibit a stronger collectivist orientation than their cohort peers in more distant counties within the same province. This finding is robust to alternative measures of collectivism and exposure to centralized regimes, more conservative inference approaches, and the inclusion of additional covariates. We further show that the effect differs across regions and between the periods before and after the PRC’s establishment in 1949, but not by demographic characteristics such as gender. In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Jiaqi Yang, we study how individuals search for information. While backward induction provides the benchmark solution to sequential information search problems, cognitive constraints and information acquisition costs often lead to myopic search. We experimentally evaluate backward induction in a sequential information acquisition task, comparing the fully rational model and the directed cognition model. Our findings show that risk preferences play a central role in shaping information search paths. Under risk neutrality, both models account for little of the observed data. In contrast, when risk aversion is incorporated, both models explain more than half of observed behavior. These results underscore the importance of risk preferences in models of information acquisition with bounded rationality.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wang, Jiarui
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Fisman, Raymond
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53680