Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation examines how the availability and transmission of information affects decision making and incentives in two distinct settings. In the first chapter, I analyze relational contracts in a principal/many-agent model where agents are connected to one another via a network. If the principal fails to pay an agreed-upon bonus, that information diffuses through the network, causing a larger number of agents to quit over time. This added consequence increases the sustainable level of production above what would be possible for each agent in isolation. However, this production remains lower than what is feasible with a multilateral contract where a single deviation results in the immediate loss of all agents' efforts. As a result, this paper serves as a middle ground that reflects many real-world situations: employees naturally form friendships and cliques, suppliers of a large manufacturer may interact regularly with overlapping subsets of other suppliers, news in general may travel slowly, and workplace custom may discourage widespread information sharing. A network allows subsidization of effort between heterogeneous agents, which can lead to greater profits, but creates `vulnerable' agents which tempt the principal to deviate. There is then a benefit to centralizing unique agents, which acts to strengthen the punishments from withholding payments to vulnerable agents. I find the optimal network in certain symmetric and small-network settings, and suggest a method for computing an optimal network in general. In the second chapter, I analyze how the type of private information available to players affects outcomes in a joint decision making process. Information can either be aligned or misaligned. When it is aligned, it reveals to each player which alternative will lead to their highest personal utility. On the other hand, when information is misaligned, players learn which alternative would be preferred by the other player. I find that with aligned information, one player is always able to force their preferred outcome, leading to a first-mover (or second-mover) advantage that depends only on players’ patience relative to the strength of their preferences. When information is misaligned, players have conflicting incentives both to reveal and to hide their private information. I characterize all pure-strategy equilibria, and find that while equilibria are often unique when prior beliefs are extreme, under more uncertainty multiple equilibria are possible, with different levels of revelation and different welfare implications. In any given equilibrium, however, the preferences of both players never simultaneously impact the final decision.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Klein, Kevin
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Lipman, Barton
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53727