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Boston University

Differential privacy and beyond: bridging the gap between formal privacy guarantees and the prevention of real-world harms

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Even as the law on data privacy takes massive strides, the regulation of privacy remains complex and contested, with persistent gaps between what laws require, what technology enables, and what people expect in practice. As computer scientists, we can design privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) with mathematically rigorous guarantees, but in practice those guarantees may fail to prevent harm because of where in a systems those PETs are deployed. Bridging the gap between \textit{provable privacy guarantees} and \textit{real world privacy protections} requires not just stronger theory or better adoption strategies alone, but explicitly confronting contextual nuances that drive privacy expectations in the real world. Meanwhile, experts in law, humanities, and social sciences, grapple explicitly with these contextual nuances, but they view data in a completely different way, making discussions between us difficult. This dissertation focuses on the development and analysis of privacy-enhancing technologies that provide rigorous guarantees while while remaining aware of the social, legal, and practical constraints in the contexts in which they are used. In addition to designing such PETs, we introduce technical definitions and frameworks that center adaptability and socio-technical legibility in order to support the development of PETs that are at once mathematically secure and suited to the real-world contexts for which they were developed. In \cref{part:uc-signal} we focus on the security of the Signal architecture, a secure instant messaging protocol which has revolutionized the concept of secure communication over the internet. The security of this protocol had already been shown for any one conversation in a vacuum, but in reality people typically participate concurrently in several conversations spanning several multi-platform chat services. Some of which use the Signal architecture (\eg~WhatsApp and Skype) and others that don’t. We show that this protocol is actually secure with respect to its real-world usage by analysing its guarantees in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. In \cref{part:continuous-observation} we focus on differential privacy (DP), which is a widely accepted standard for private data analysis. We explore the practical constraints faced by algorithms that satisfy DP under continual observation, a framework of DP that not only describes existing deployments of private online algorithms~\cite{Apple17}, but also arises as an intermediate step inside the analysis of some offline learning algorithms~\cite{kairouzMSTTX21}. In particular, 1) we show the first strong lower bounds on the accuracy of private algorithms that are differentially private under continual observation. 2) We then consider the problem of counting distinct elements---a fundamental problem for AI systems. We show that considering the realities of practical data streams enables us to bypass worst case accuracy lower bounds for this problem without diluting the actual privacy protections for any data stream. In \cref{part:demcoh} we provide a framework for analysing PETs, called \emph{demographic coherence}, that is designed intentionally with socio-technical legibility in mind. In particular demographic coherence can act as a structured interface between experts approaching privacy from different lenses because it formalizes predictive harm in a way that is both quantitatively measurable and normatively interpretable. Although the framework could easily be simplified if it were built for technical legibility alone, it explicitly leaves in details which enable conversations about power dynamics, data availability, social context to remain grounded in the same formal, interpretable quantities, ultimately allowing for productive friction between equally important and competing concerns.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jain, Palak
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Smith, Adam D

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53741

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Jain, Palak. Differential privacy and beyond: bridging the gap between formal privacy guarantees and the prevention of real-world harms. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53741