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Boston University

Professional regulation and human capital formation: board wars, bar raisers, and buddy systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine fundamental questions in labor economics, with particular focus on occupational licensing, professional development, and workplace collaboration. The chapters investigate how regulatory frameworks shape professional labor markets and how institutional structures affect worker quality and productivity. The first chapter examines competition between occupational licensing boards for substitute professions, challenging the conventional single-board approach to analyzing occupational licensing. I develop and structurally estimate a model where professional organizations choose licensing stringency to maximize industry profits while accounting for competitive responses. Testing this theory using historical competition between medical doctors and chiropractors from 1907–1960, I find that medical boards responded strategically to chiropractic licensing by increasing entry requirements, with substantial effects on practitioner welfare and market structure. The second chapter provides comprehensive analysis of teacher quality changes following substantial increases in licensing test difficulty. Using longitudinal administrative data from Indiana, we find that despite a significant drop in new licenses issued following the change in the licensure test standard, the overall quality of incoming teachers and the relative quality of licensed teachers compared to unlicensed teachers remained largely unchanged. The third chapter investigates how workplace collaboration creates persistent peer effects on individual worker productivity through co-teaching partnerships in education.I find that pairing with highly experienced partners raises student achievement after teachers return to solo instruction, while pairing with inexperienced partners produces no gains. Strategic pairing of junior teachers with experienced mentors could accelerate skill development. Together, these chapters contribute to our understanding of occupational licensing policy, professional development programs, and the design of collaborative work structures in licensed professions.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Fallon, John
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Lang, Kevin
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53757

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Fallon, John. Professional regulation and human capital formation: board wars, bar raisers, and buddy systems. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53757