Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation studies how legal and institutional reforms shape economic and political outcomes. Across three chapters, I examine how changes in formal rules affect behavior in political markets, labor markets, and firm-level transactions. I show that although legal reforms are often designed to expand opportunity or improve efficiency, their effects depend on how individuals, political actors, and firms respond to new incentives and constraints. The first chapter examines how political parties respond to gender quota mandates in Mexico. The second chapter studies how expanding married women’s property rights in the nineteenth-century in the United States affected female labor supply and marriage decisions. The third chapter evaluates how introducing formal contracts affects firm behavior and service quality in Malawi. Together, these chapters contribute to the literature on institutional design, gender economics, and contract theory and show that legal reforms affect outcomes not only through direct mechanical effects but also through strategic responses by political actors, households, and firms.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Aquino Arriaga, Laura Alicia
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Fisman, Raymond
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53783