Arts
Individual Differences Reveal Relationships Between Mental Imagery and Semantic Processing
Abstract
dc:description.abstractConcept knowledge is central to our ability to interact with people and with our environments, yet the process by which we derive meaning from language is not fully understood. Multiple representation theories propose that we simulate sensory and motor experiences that are associated with a word’s meaning, yet it is unclear exactly what constitutes simulation. One possibility is that simulation uses the same mechanisms as those that underpin other forms of sensory and motor experience in the absence of input and/or action execution, such as mental imagery. In my thesis studies I test whether simulation in semantic processing shares mechanisms with simulation in mental imagery. In Chapter 2 I demonstrate novel simulation effects in semantic processing related to words referring to foot and hand actions. I also identify a potential shared mechanism between imagery for object-directed hand actions and body-object interaction effects in semantic processing. The results of these experiments point to a specific system of object-directed action representations that underpins simulation for both mental imagery and language processing. In Chapter 3 I demonstrate that relationships between mental imagery and semantic processing at an individual level are sensitive to task demands. Responses in tasks that require participants to explicitly rate the amount of graspable actions associated with a word’s meaning appear to be related to the vividness of mental imagery, rather than to accurate representations of said imagery. In Chapter 4 I describe embodied cognition theories of concept knowledge and their potential to share mechanisms with mental imagery. I then propose that an absence of mental imagery, as present in aphantasia, may prove a fruitful testing ground to elucidate shared simulation mechanisms between these two cognitive domains. Finally, in Chapter 5 I test predictions derived from Chapter 4 and find that mental simulation in semantic processing is preserved in aphantasia. I discuss how these findings inform our understanding of conscious vs unconscious simulation and the nature of deficits in aphantasia. Across my thesis studies I explore shared mechanisms of simulation in mental imagery and language processing, testing the limits of where these processes overlap by varying the type of mental imagery measures used, the semantic processing task demands, and the types of neural substrates implicated in simulation. The results inform embodied theories of concept knowledge by identifying potential mechanisms of simulation that are unique to object knowledge and point to the a broader role of simulation in higher cognition.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Psychology
- Grantor
- Arts
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Muraki, Emiko Joanne
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Pexman, Penny
- Protzner, Andrea
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Iaria, Giuseppe
- Kam, Julia
- Sean Dukelow
- Lupyan, Gary
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Unless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Citation
- Muraki, E. (2025). Individual differences reveal relationships between mental imagery and semantic processing (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.