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Cal Poly

Machine-Checked Proofs for Correctness Guarantees in Containment Architectures

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Modern computing systems are increasingly susceptible to attacks at the hardware and software levels. Formal methods offer promising guarantees as to the correctness and security of systems. However, these methods tend to scale poorly and are thus insufficient to protect complex systems. Leveraging minimal amounts of trusted hardware and software to ensure the security of whole systems is a promising approach to gain the benefits of formal methods without having to overcome the scaling problem. TrustGuard realizes this approach: a containment architecture model that requires all outgoing communication from the host computer to be validated by a small, external hardware module called the Sentry. In essence, the trusted Sentry ensures that only correct behavior of the host computer system is visible outside of the system. The nature of TrustGuard requires precise coordination and synchronization of the host and the Sentry. Previous work has provided a paper-based proof of the correctness of this host-Sentry relationship. However, proofs done on paper are inherently susceptible to human error and may contain subtle gaps. This thesis provides the first step towards a formally verified TrustGuard system. Leveraging Agda, an automated theorem prover, we present a mechanically-checked proof of the host-Sentry relationship. Additionally, we implement a framework to verify arbitrary programs within this system.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
MS in Computer Science
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Russ, Sophie
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Stephen R. Beard
  • Computer Science
  • College of Engineering

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3097

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cal Poly
Base URL
digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Russ, Sophie. Machine-Checked Proofs for Correctness Guarantees in Containment Architectures. https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3097