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Carleton University

Securing Decentralized Software Installation and Updates

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Software installation and updates have become simpler for end users in recent years. The commoditization of the internet has enabled users to obtain more software than ever before from more developers than ever before. Additionally, software installation now requires less input from users, allowing installation with merely a single click or tap. At the same time, different software installation models with varying levels of security, usability and freedom have emerged. In centralized environments, available software is limited by an authority, whereas decentralized environments allow users and developers to interact freely. Decentralized software installation ecosystems pose the most significant security challenges due to the lack of centralized control. In this thesis we identify, through systematic evaluation of prominent systems, limitations in the way operating systems provide security guarantees (including verification of integrity, authentication, and establishment of trust) in decentralized software installation environments. We address these limitations by designing tools and protocols that help secure software installation and updates at each of the three installation stages (software discovery, initial install and updates, and enforcing security policies). Specifically, we propose a cryptographically verifiable protocol for developers to delegate digital signature privileges to other certificates (possibly owned by other developers) without requiring a centrally trusted public key infrastructure. Our proposal allows trust to be delegated during software updates without user involvement. We also propose a flexible policy for developers to authenticate and share privileges amongst applications being executed simultaneously on a device. We evaluate these proposals and show that they are direct improvements over currently deployed real-world systems. We discuss the design and implementation of an install-time architecture allowing users to query crowdsourced expert information sources to gain trust in software they are about to install. We motivate the requirements for such a system, designed to mirror the security semantics of centralized environments. The proposed protocols and tools have been implemented as proofs-of-concept using Google's Android mobile operating system. We leverage a large application dataset to inform our design decisions and demonstrate backward compatibility with existing applications. While the implementations are specific to Android, we discuss how our general proposals extend to other decentralized environments.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Carleton University
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Barrera, David Jose

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright © 2014 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Carleton University
Base URL
carleton.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Barrera, David Jose. Securing Decentralized Software Installation and Updates. Doctoral thesis, Carleton University, 2014. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14718/38541