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Clemson University

Timing Side-Channel Attacks on SSH

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In most secure communication standards today, additional latency is kept to a minimum to preserve the Quality-of-Service. As a result, it is possible to mount side-channel attacks using timing analysis. In this thesis we discuss the viability of these attacks, and demonstrate them by inferring Hidden Markov Models of protocols. These Hidden Markov Models can be used to both detect protocol use and infer information about protocol state. We create experiments that use Markov models to generate traffic and show that we can accurately reconstruct models under many circumstances. We analyze what occurs when timing delays have enough jitter that we can not accurately assign packets to bins. Finally, we show that we can accurately identify the language used for cryptographically protected interactive sessions - Italian or English - on-line with as few as 77 symbols. A maximum-likelihood estimator, the forward-backward procedure, and confidence interval analysis are compared.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science (MS)
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Engineering

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bhanu, Harikrishnan
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Brooks, Richard R
  • Schalkoff , Robert J
  • Russell , Harlan B

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://open.clemson.edu/all_theses/781

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Clemson University
Base URL
open.clemson.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Bhanu, Harikrishnan. Timing Side-Channel Attacks on SSH. Thesis thesis, https://open.clemson.edu/all_theses/781