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Cornell University

ESSAYS IN CORPORATE LOBBYING, DIVIDEND POLICY, AND FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Do Firms Gain from Lobbying? Evidence from Congressional Committee Assignments: Estimates on firm outcomes from lobbying are difficult to obtain due to a strong selection into lobbying; the average lobbying firm has roughly ten times the assets of the average nonlobbying firm. In order to separate the effect from lobbying, I exploit the quasi-random variation in lobbying induced by Congress members’ assignment to powerful tax writing committees. I find that smaller firms are more likely to lobby if a Congress member from their state or district is assigned to one of these committees. Lobbying by these smaller firms results in significantly higher employment and sales; lobbying by larger firms results in a lower tax rate. Disappearing and Reappearing Dividends (with Roni Michaely): We decompose the decrease (1970s-2000) and subsequent recovery (2000-current) in the percent of dividend-paying firms. Changes in firm characteristics and the proclivity to pay dividends (probability of paying dividends conditional on characteristics) each drive half of the dividend disappearance. By contrast, a higher proclivity to pay dividends drives 82% of the reappearing dividends. The remaining reappearance is driven by a single characteristic: reduced earnings volatility. Newly listed and delisted firms drive these trends, rather than dividend omissions or initiations. Finally, total payout (dividends + repurchases) disappears to a substantially lesser extent than dividends, indicating some substitution between dividends and repurchases. A Classification Framework for Stablecoin Designs (with Kevin Sekniqi and Emin Gun Sirer): Although most people are aware of Bitcoin, especially after its meteoric rise in price at the end of 2017, the vast majority of people choose not to hold or use Bitcoin or similar cryptoassets. Stablecoins promise to bridge fiat currencies with this emerging world of cryptocurrencies. They provide a way for users to take advantage of the benefits of digital currencies, such as ability to transfer assets over the internet, credibly commit to minting schedules, and enable new asset classes, while also partially mitigating their volatility risks. In this paper, we systematically discuss general design, decompose existing stablecoins into various component design elements, explore their strengths and drawbacks, and identify future directions.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Moin, Amani Ula
Chairs dc:contributor.chair
  • Kim, Hyunseob
  • Michaely, Roni
Committee member dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Berger, Elizabeth Anne

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
13277912
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12175
ProQuest Publication ID: 28086999

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Moin, Amani Ula. ESSAYS IN CORPORATE LOBBYING, DIVIDEND POLICY, AND FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/103109