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Cornell University

Meritocracy and Cronyism in the Political Selection System: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities in China

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis investigates the determinants of bureaucratic promotion in China. By analyzing the 2005-2016 panel data on 283 prefecture-level cities, I find unlike previous studies, the effect of economic performance, as the typical criteria for the meritocratic political selection system, is not strong in these years. Instead, factional ties, i.e. connections built through work, education, or shared birthplaces, as a symbol of cronyism in the system, are found to be positively correlated with promotion. Individual characteristics including age and education exert positive effects as well. Further analyses also show that in recent years, land revenue does not have the distortionary effect of reducing GDP growth in promotion.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
M.S., Applied Economics and Management
Level thesis:degree_level
Master of Science
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Applied Economics and Management
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hu, Xingyi
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Basu, Arnab K.
Committee member dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Chau, Nancy

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
13277939
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 10822
ProQuest Publication ID: 27837520

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Hu, Xingyi. Meritocracy and Cronyism in the Political Selection System: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities in China. Master of Science thesis, Cornell University, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/103166