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Cornell University

The Social Epistemology of Prejudice & Privacy: Towards New Frameworks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My dissertation explores prejudice, particularly what makes prejudices resistant to change, and the impact of prejudice in the world, such as how prejudice influences our norms and practices of privacy. In the first chapter, I engage with a common view of prejudice, ‘the Bad Emotion view,’ which claims prejudices are negative stereotypes driven by bad emotions. These bad emotions cause the agent to act irrationally in the face of counterevidence and partly explain prejudice’s epistemic resilience. I argue that some prejudices don’t involve bad emotions at all, and many prejudices involve emotional complexity. A common assumption about prejudices is that they involve an epistemic mistake – namely, an unjustified belief. However, some who endorse the view that prejudices are stereotypes argue that prejudices can be justified. In my second chapter, I argue that the epistemic problem of prejudice is not a failure to justify beliefs (though many prejudices will be unjustified). To find the epistemic mistake involved in prejudice, we need to look beyond stereotypes and their logical structures: we need to look to the larger belief structure that the stereotype is housed in, and some prejudices might not even involve stereotypes at all. Instead, I argue that the epistemic problem with prejudices is their epistemic resilience. I advance a novel account of prejudice which holds that they are conceptual frameworks — networks of beliefs, methods, assumptions and concepts. I argue that these conceptual frameworks of prejudice are motivated by supporting an agent’s (perceived) interests. In the third chapter, I look into the connection between privacy and social epistemology. I argue that a prominent theory of privacy developed by Helen Nissenbaum, Contextual Integrity, does not account for how unjust social power relations shape the norms and practices surrounding privacy. I argue that privacy violations are both more pervasive and harmful for marginalized groups. Many privacy violations are caused by epistemic injustices, such as, when distrust for a marginalized group causes someone to look for more information. I claim there is a particular kind of privacy violation caused by epistemic injustice which I call ‘knowledge entitlements.’

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Patterson, Alicia Eleanora
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Silins, Nicholas
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Markovits, Julia
  • Kosch, M.

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
13312112
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12359
ProQuest Publication ID: 28259909

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Patterson, Alicia Eleanora. The Social Epistemology of Prejudice & Privacy: Towards New Frameworks. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/103459