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Cornell University

DECISION MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL SPILLOVERS

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My research is concerned with decision making in the presence of peer spillovers. Peers’ behavior can change each other’s incentives or levy externalities on one another, thereby complicating decision making as well as the estimation of primitives from observations of decisions. In my dissertation, I address instances of the resulting challenges in topics ranging from public health and development economics to the study of making friends and contacts. The first paper explores the optimal distribution of a limited number of preventative treatments (e.g., vaccines) for deadly infectious diseases such as malaria or Ebola among individuals on a network. While the literature in economics has considered the optimal distributions of treatments in the presence of heterogenous treatment effects, the main contribution of my paper lies in accommodating for spillovers in treatments. I extend the empirical welfare maximization (EWM) protocol to do so. EMW estimates an optimal rationing rule using data from a randomized control trial (RCT). I start by explicitly modeling disease propagation on contact networks. In two separate models with distinct assumptions that are separately compatible with malaria and Ebola, I place restrictions on how others’ treatments affect one’s outcome as well as assumptions on the shapes of networks considered. I show that as the size of the experiment grows, EWM assigns the treatments to the same nodes on the network as would a planner with complete information on which nodes had the greatest impacts on the population as a whole. I also show that there can exist no statistical procedure with a faster rate of convergence. The second paper considers the role of incentives in Joint Liability Lending (JLL) microfinance programs. JLL is a common loan contract offered, particularly in South Asia. The basic premise is that participating households organize into groups to receive a joint liability loan. In such a contract, the obligation of repaying the loan falls collectively on the group and not on individual members. If the group fails to repay, the lender refuses to offer any member of the group a loan thereafter. Using a game theoretic model, I am able to demonstrate an atypical inefficiency arising in equilibrium where peer pressure leads to excessive repayment. I demonstrate that this excessive repayment, often heralded as a measure of success of the program, inefficiently shifts the burden of risk on to the participants and away from the lender. I then demonstrate that this results in participants using the loan for inefficiently safe investments rather than investments which would increase their productive capacity. Thus, I argue that the informal incentives in the form of peer pressure that JLL leverages to induce high repayments also lead to incentives that do not allow borrowers to escape poverty. In the final paper, joint with Francesca Molinari, we consider identification and estimation of models of network formation. We construct a sharp identified region for parameters of the network formation game under the assumptions that individuals’ preference are only over local network topologies and not the entire network. In particular, we assume that every individual can have a fixed finite number of links and has preferences from links between nodes up to a fixed finite distance on the network. This allows for testing important drivers of social link formation. During an epidemic, it is very desirable to understand how the network of social interactions evolve as measure like social distancing and quarantining are put into effect. A pre-requisite to doing so is the identification and estimation of network formation games. Hence this paper bridges a gap in the literature on identifying models of network formation.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ananth, Abhishek
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Molinari, Francesca
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Easley, David
  • Blume, Lawrence Edward
  • Stoye, Joerg

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15049554
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12532
ProQuest Publication ID: 28494315

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ananth, Abhishek. DECISION MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL SPILLOVERS. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/109708