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Cornell University

Real Effects of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I investigate the real effects of Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires that firms disclose the ratio of total CEO compensation to the median employee compensation. Using a difference-in-differences framework and granular data at the establishment-level, I document that Section 953(b) leads to employment cuts. Employment cuts are particularly severe in firms that have high CEO pay, in states that have weak labor protection laws, and in establishments that are part of the firm’s noncentral operations. These employment cuts are accompanied by an increase in spending on information technology, suggesting that firms are changing their mixture of inputs rather than downscaling their operations.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Management
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Yeung, Kelvin Kwok Shing
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Zuo, Luo
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Yeung, Eric
  • Forman, Chris
  • Campello, Murillo

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15049453
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12458
ProQuest Publication ID: 28416103

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Yeung, Kelvin Kwok Shing. Real Effects of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/109826