Abstract
dc:description.abstractI investigate the real effects of Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires that firms disclose the ratio of total CEO compensation to the median employee compensation. Using a difference-in-differences framework and granular data at the establishment-level, I document that Section 953(b) leads to employment cuts. Employment cuts are particularly severe in firms that have high CEO pay, in states that have weak labor protection laws, and in establishments that are part of the firm’s noncentral operations. These employment cuts are accompanied by an increase in spending on information technology, suggesting that firms are changing their mixture of inputs rather than downscaling their operations.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Management
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Management
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2021
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Yeung, Kelvin Kwok Shing
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Zuo, Luo
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Yeung, Eric
- Forman, Chris
- Campello, Murillo
Subjects
dc:subject × 5Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 15049453
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 12458
ProQuest Publication ID: 28416103