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Cornell University

Mechanisms for Provable Integrity Protection in Decentralized Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Decentralized systems are built from a set of coordinating independent services. Yet these services might not trust each other, making it difficult to maintain the integrity of the whole application. This dissertation explores two different approaches to achieving provable integrity guarantees in such systems. The first technique, realized in Solidus, applies cryptographic tools to provably preserve the integrity of a blockchain-based financial transaction system while hiding the sender, receiver, and value of each transaction. The second complements the cryptographic approach by showing how to achieve strong integrity guarantees for realistic systems using language-based Information Flow Control (IFC). Traditional IFC systems only provide strong integrity guarantees in the absence of endorsement---treating inputs as more trusted than their source---but endorsement is necessary in real-world systems. This work classifies two ways in which unrestricted endorsements can compromise system integrity if attackers violate implicit assumptions. In both cases, IFC ideas help define security and support language-based rules to provably eliminate all attacks in the class.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Computer Science
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cecchetti, Ethan
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Myers, Andrew C.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Juels, Ari
  • Kozen, Dexter

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15160102
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12682
ProQuest Publication ID: 28652333

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Cecchetti, Ethan. Mechanisms for Provable Integrity Protection in Decentralized Systems. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/110522