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Cornell University

Essays on Economics and Computer Science

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation considers a number of problems in pure and applied game theory. The first chapter considers the problem of how the introduction of fines and monitoring affects welfare in a routing game. I characterize equilibria of the game and discuss network topologies in which the introduction of fines can harm those agents which are not subject to them. The second, and primary, chapter considers the computational aspects of tenable strategy sets. I characterize these set-valued solution concepts using the more familiar framework of perturbed strategies, introduce strong alternatives to the problems of verifying whether a strategy block satisfies the conditions of tenability, and provide some hardness results regarding the verification of fine tenability. Additionally, I show an inclusion relation between the concept of coarse tenability and the notion of stability introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Finally, I show how the methods developed for tenability provide an alternative characterization for proper equilibria in bimatrix games. This characterization gives a bound on the perturbations required in the definition of proper equilibria, though such bounds cannot be computed efficiently in general. The third, and final, chapter develops a model of contracting for content creation in an oligopolistic environment of attention intermediaries. I characterize symmetric equilibria in single-homing (exclusive) and multi-homing regimes. The focus is on the trade-off between reductions in incentives offered by intermediaries and the benefits of access to additional content for consumers. I show that when the extent of multi-homing is exogenous in the absence of exclusivity clauses, consumer surplus is always higher with multi-homing than under exclusivity, despite weaker incentives offered by platforms to content creators.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Porter, Tyler
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Easley, David
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Denti, Tommaso
  • Tardos, Eva
  • Blume, Lawrence Edward

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15312687
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12793
ProQuest Publication ID: 28720347

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Porter, Tyler. Essays on Economics and Computer Science. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/110828