Cornell University
Virtue Signaling: Policy Goals, Public Narratives and Investigative Agenda-Setting in Congress
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe extant literature on oversight and investigations in Congress offers compelling explanatory frameworks for why members conduct oversight of the executive branch, but cannot account for why members choose to investigate one particular issue and institution over another. Via a new theory of investigative agenda-setting in the federal legislature, I argue that investigations in Congress constitute public narratives aimed at facilitating two collective goods: change of status-quo policy and accountability for institutional actors who have violated legitimate legal and policy frameworks. My project makes two primary contributions. First, I show that oversight is a fundamental part of the policymaking process: Both chambers, over time, have prioritized hearings devoted to issues, or policy problems, over hearings on waste, fraud and abuse in the executive branch. Second, I demonstrate that oversight, like the legislative process, is pluralistic. I propose a new typology of all investigative activity in Congress, and show that the five discrete types of oversight I identify respond to different member incentives over time.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Government
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Government
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2021
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Leavitt, Claire Catherine
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Mettler, Suzanne
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Bensel, Richard F.
- Kriner, Douglas L.
- Bateman, David Alexander
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 15312737
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 12822
ProQuest Publication ID: 28773471