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Cornell University

FREEDOM, ACTION, AND THE CONDITIONS FOR BLAME AND PRAISE

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This work concerns the nature of moral responsibility, and in particular the conditions under which blame and praise may be appropriate. Each chapter focuses on a different kind of condition for moral responsibility—responsiveness to reasons, the ability to do otherwise, or having the right motivation for action. In Chapter 1, I argue that reasons-responsiveness is neither necessary nor explanatory as a control condition for moral responsibility. I present a counterexample to this proposed condition involving an agent who’s willfully impulsive and show that responsiveness to reasons cannot be the explanation for his blameworthiness. Instead, I suggest that blameworthiness is explained by his ability to settle on a particular action, which is a condition that can be met with or without satisfying reasons-responsiveness conditions. In Chapter 2, I defend the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (PAP) against a certain kind of Frankfurt-style case—buffered alternatives. I develop a new dilemma for buffered alternatives cases which shows that they fail to constitute counterexamples to the PAP. I argue that the introduction of the buffer, though it may remove certain alternative possibilities, shifts the locus of responsibility to earlier provisional or character-forming decisions. In Chapter 3, I assess accounts of positive moral worth that take doing the right thing for the right reason to be necessary, and perhaps sufficient, for praiseworthiness. I evaluate these accounts by applying them to several challenging cases, with the goal of determining whether they accord with intuitive judgments. This involves varying either the nature of the action itself or the motivations for action and then determining what the accounts would and ought to say about praiseworthiness. While I conclude that the accounts do well at explaining our intuitions about difficult cases, I argue that some right thing for the right reason accounts have advantages over others in certain contexts.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Paskell, Matthew
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Pereboom, Derk
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Markovits, Julia
  • Nichols, Shaun B.

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15529866
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13076
ProQuest Publication ID: 29168824

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Paskell, Matthew. FREEDOM, ACTION, AND THE CONDITIONS FOR BLAME AND PRAISE. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/111772