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Cornell University

WASHINGTON AND WALL STREET: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, FINANCIAL DEREGULATION, AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

After maintaining significant regulatory constraints on financial institutions from the New Deal to the 1970s, congressional Democrats dismantled the New Deal regulatory regime for finance during the 1980s and 1990s. Why did Democrats unleash Wall Street despite a broad coalition of interest groups that opposed deregulation, and the party’s continued concern about the concentration of economic power? In this dissertation, I argue that the institutional fit between the level of centralization in Congress and concentration in the economy explain stability and change in Democrats’ position on financial regulatory policy. Centralizing institutional reforms in Congress undercut parochialism, and empowered Democratic leaders to advance the party’s collective interest by deregulating finance on behalf of American consumers and Wall Street. However, by choosing financial markets and the diffuse interests of American consumers over the “entrenched” interests of small local banks, adjacent small businesses and organized labor, Democrats significantly contributed to wealth inequality, geographic inequality, and market concentration, which in turn has resulted in political inequality and the weakening of American democracy.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Government
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Government
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Barton, Richard C
Chairs dc:contributor.chair
  • Mettler, Suzanne
  • Bateman, David Alexander
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Bensel, Richard F.
  • Kriner, Douglas L.
  • Roberts, Kenneth

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15578729
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13303
ProQuest Publication ID: 29324285

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Barton, Richard C. WASHINGTON AND WALL STREET: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, FINANCIAL DEREGULATION, AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/111918