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Cornell University

From Attack to Defense: Building Systems Secure against Breached Credentials

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Targeted attacks using breached credentials exploit the fact that users reuse some semantic or syntactic structure of passwords across websites to make them easy to remember. The adversary tries to log in to a victim’s account using thestolen passwords or variants of these passwords. Protecting accounts from these attacks remains challenging. Adversaries have wide-scale access to billions of stolen credentials from breach compilations, while users and identity providers remain in the dark about which accounts require attention. Our contribution is to show that it is possible to build a large-scale system that allows users to check for vulnerabilities against these attacks without sacrificing the functionality, security, and performance properties. We initiate the work by addressing the core challenge — modeling how humans choose similar passwords. We train models using modern machine learning techniques and exhibit its efficacy by simulating the most damaging attack to date. Then we formalize the security goals for existing breach checking services that warn if the exact credential is publicly exposed. In the process we also propose novel exact-checking protocols with better security guarantees. All this helps educate the design of the second-generation, similarity-aware, and privacy-preserving credential checking service — Might I get Pwned (MIGP). Finally, we collaborate with Cloudflare to deploy MIGP as part of the web application firewall to notify login servers about potential attacks.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Computer Science
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pal, Bijeeta
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Ristenpart, Thomas
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Shmatikov, Vitaly
  • Ju, Wendy Guang-wen

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15578837
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13183
ProQuest Publication ID: 29262056

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Pal, Bijeeta. From Attack to Defense: Building Systems Secure against Breached Credentials. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112026