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Cornell University

Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ridesharing Networks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Ridesharing markets are complex: drivers are strategic, rider demand anddriver availability are stochastic, and complex city-scale phenomena like weather induce large scale correlation across space and time. At the same time, past work has focused on a subset of these challenges. We propose a model of ridesharing networks with strategic drivers, spatiotemporal dynamics, and stochasticity. Supporting both computational tractability and better modeling flexibility than classical fluid limits, we use a two-level stochastic model that allows correlated shocks caused by weather or large public events. Using this model, we propose a novel pricing mechanism: stochastic spatiotemporal pricing (SSP). We show that the SSP mechanism is asymptotically incentive-compatible and that all (approximate) equilibria of the resulting gameare asymptotically welfare-maximizing when the market is large enough. The SSP mechanism iteratively recomputes prices based on realized demand and supply, and in this sense prices dynamically. We show that this is critical: while a static variant of the SSP mechanism (whose prices vary with the market-level stochastic scenario but not individual rider and driver decisions) has a sequence of asymptotically welfare-optimal approximate equilibria, we demonstrate that it also has other equilibria producing extremely low social welfare. Thus, we argue that dynamic pricing is important for ensuring robustness in stochastic ride-sharing networks.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Operations Research and Information Engineering
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Operations Research and Information Engineering
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cashore, John Massey
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Frazier, Peter
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Tardos, Eva
  • Banerjee, Siddhartha
  • Henderson, Shane

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
15644082
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13359
ProQuest Publication ID: 29992375

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Cashore, John Massey. Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ridesharing Networks. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112904